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Abiy’s forces seize Tigrayan capital as El Sisi hosts regional anti-Addis coalition

Fall of Mekelle is a heavy blow to the TPLF but is unlikely to stop the war or end regional tensions

The claims that Ethiopia’s Federal forces have recaptured the Tigray regional capital of Mekelle on 4 October follows a string of military successes against the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) over the past week.

Initially, it had looked like the TPLF had been able to seize the military advantage. It launched its offensive on 23 September, quickly taking control of the federal airports at Mekelle, Axum and Shire (AC Vol 67 No 20, Abiy’s military advantage meets a broader insurgent challenge).

With TPLF fighters moving along with Amhara Fano fighters into North Wollo and joint operations with Afar rebels towards the main highway between Addis Ababa and Djibouti, there was a sense of a coordinated campaign against Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s government in Addis Ababa.

That sense was short-lived. By 4 October, the Ethiopian National Defence Forces (ENDF) and the Tigray Peace Force (TPF), a dissident breakaway from the TPLF, had jointly reversed almost all the opposition gains in Afar, had retaken Alamata and then had moved onto Mekelle, first the airport and then the city.

Mekelle is a symbolic prize for the ENDF. Its loss deprives the TPLF of its political and administrative capital. There has been no formal transfer of control but the Federal government is likely to set up an interim administration, perhaps with the TPF taking the main positions to consolidate its grip on the Tigrayan capital.

That doesn’t mean the end of the war. The TPLF retains many experienced cadres and chose to withdraw from Mekelle rather than fight a pitched battle there. TPLF Chairman Debretsion Gebremichael described the withdrawals as strategic, signalling a move to mobile operations (AC Vol 67 No 10, TPLF buries the Pretoria peace deal as Washington courts Asmara).

That tactic worked for a time in the previous Federal forces war with the TPLF from 2020-2022. Then the TPLF fighters left the capital, regrouped and came back in force to retake and launch a bold southbound offensive towards Addis Ababa.

This time the dynamics are very different. The TPLF has an alliance of sorts with Fano insurgents in Amhara region and rebels in the Afar region. But the Federal forces are taking full advantage of their alliance with the TPF, whose members have a strong base in the region as political rivals to the TPLF (AC Vol 67 No 17, Abiy’s enemies find common cause).

The other big difference is regional. Eritrea and Addis Ababa were military allies in the 2020-22 war; now they are on opposing sides. They broke diplomatic relations on 1 October. And the Sudan Armed Forces regime in Khartoum accuses Abiy’s government of covertly backing the Rapid Support Forces via logistical bases in western Ethiopia.

Ethiopia and Egypt have expelled each other’s diplomats in reciprocal moves. Their dispute was fired up by the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Nile. Now officials in Addis Ababa accuse Egypt of backing Ethiopia’s regional opponents and underwriting the latest war.

But in public, Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah el Sisi has been cautious, denying any role in the conflict and advising Abiy to resolve his country’s internal political problems. On 3 October Sisi met Eritrea’s President Issayas Afewerki, reaffirming support for the country’s security and territorial integrity. But there was no new formal military alliance.

At the same time Sisi and Somalia’s President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud agreed to step up cooperation on the Horn of Africa, Gulf of Aden, Bab el Mandeb and the Red Sea. They consolidated the strategic partnership they had announced in January 2025 and Hassan Sheikh elicited a statement from Sisi rejecting recognition or support for the breakaway state of Somaliland.

Sisi’s chairing of the Quadrilateral summit on 4 October in Alamein, with Eritrea, Somalia and Sudan, gave each country a political benefit and declaration of support from the group. It also set up a follow-up mechanism for regular diplomatic, security and economic coordination.

All this may be taken as Cairo’s attempt at encirclement by the foreign ministry in Addis Ababa. But Ethiopia can also rely on strong backing from the United Arab Emirates, Kenya and Uganda.

Sisi’s Quadrilateral summit tried to assume a constructive position in the region, calling for a dialogue and not military action. But it also sent clear messages to Addis Ababa: against unilateral actions on the Nile, control of the Red Sea coastline and recognition of Eritrea’s and Sudan’s state sovereignty (under the SAF).

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