Other obstacles prevented Chad from aligning with Russia or joining the AES after the death of Mahamat Kaka's warrior-president father Idriss Déby Itno who was killed fighting insurgents in April 2021 (AC Vol 62 No 9 Regional leaders pay homage to Déby at funeral summit)...

Mahamat Kaka consulted French President Emmanuel Macron with whom he still had good relations and was reminded that putschists were not supposed to lead major regional organisations...

When Goïta phoned Mahamat Kaka in May 2021 to demand the G5 chairmanship the two had a furious argument we hear...

Tiani we hear asked Mahamat Kaka to hand Sallah over to Niamey where he could be punished...

Mahamat Kaka said he could not act because Sallah is a blood relative of Ousmane Adam Dicki head of the Force d'Intervention Rapide (FIR) a special paramilitary presidential guard personally loyal to the Chadian president and vital to his security...

While the US may be outbidding Russian influence in the Sahel in Chad's case it was the United Arab Emirates that made an offer Mahamat Kaka could not refuse...

It is also reported in Chadian diplomatic circles that Putin failed to establish any rapport with Mahamat Kaka when they met in Moscow in January 2024...

For Mahamat Kaka Moscow cannot compete with the funds and backing of the UAE just as Putin cannot match the US in courting Goïta if Washington sets aside its previous reluctance to engage with military governments that consciously abjure democracy...

The UAE relentlessly denies as do countries such as Chad Ethiopia and Uganda which are accused of operating arms transit hubs for the RSF of supplying any military hardware to the RSF (AC Vol 66 No 23 Abu Dhabi pressures Mahamat Kaka)...

And following Chadian President Mahamat Déby's visit to the Élysée on 29 January a new accord on economics and cultural cooperation is helping to rebuild the partnership a year after the enforced departure of the decades-old French military presence at Ndjamena's behest...

The chaos is partly due to Mahamat Kaka's replacement of his father's entourage and allies with his own people in a disorderly process...

Confusion afflicts key members of the Chadian elite who know that their fellow Zaghawa people are being slaughtered in El Fasher by the RSF which the Ndjamena regime is obliged to support because of the hundreds of millions of dollars it receives from the United Arab Emirates (AC Vol 66 No 23 Abu Dhabi pressures Mahamat Kaka)...

The UAE pays Chad to be the main supply route for its support of the RSF and the impoverished Mahamat Kaka cannot bite the hand that feeds him even though it creates pressures at home (AC Vol 66 No 7 Mahamat Kaka is caught between Khartoum's anger and Emirati cash)...

On the surface Mahamat Kaka's position is unassailable...

Mahamat Kaka is trying to emulate his father but he lacks not only legitimacy but the necessary political experience...

Another problem is the clumsiness and visibility of the plunder of the state by Mahamat Kaka's newly promoted cronies which is even affecting the functionality of the civilian state apparatus...

Mahamat Kaka is unable to rein it in and faces the criticism of the old guard loyal to his father...

Mahamat Kaka's regime tried to prevent army officers joining Zaghawa armed groups in Darfur (about 1 500 reportedly did so) but remained silent as Chadian Arabs and Ouaddaï people joined the RSF...

To consolidate his base Mahamat Kaka appointed dozens of generals – many still living in rural areas and receiving stipends fuel and other subsidies...

Mahamat Kaka's control over the state security apparatus depends heavily on funding from Abu Dhabi...

The Zaghawa groups most marginalised by Mahamat Kaka's policies – the Kobe and Kapka – lost key positions in the state...

Mahamat Kaka is under pressure...

The Chadian government's plan to build another refinery near Ndjamena was undermined by Mahamat Kaka's inability to explain the ongoing fuel shortage – even for public services...

Rather than securing development funds observers believe Mahamat Kaka's priority was to seek direct support from UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed al Nahyan (MBZ) – aware that Zaghawa unity is fragile and could yet turn against him...

The funds had gone to pay for Mahamat Kaka's election campaign which upset Angola...

Chad has become a less significant transit point due to mounting challenges to President Mahamat Déby's regime while Libya Central African Republic and South Sudan are now preferred routes for UAE arms shipments to the RSF...

Mahamat's kowtowing to UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed bin al Nahyan though not new is losing him credibility and support at home (AC Vol 66 No 7 Mahamat Kaka is caught between Khartoum's anger and Emirati cash)...

Mahamat Kaka faces a similar challenge to his father between 2003 and 2005: how to rein in a military deeply divided over Sudan policy...