PREVIEW
The president’s pledge to end elite capture and patronage has been dropped for the ethnic identity politics which dominated the old one-party state
President William Ruto’s falling out with his core Mount Kenya constituency – followed by the impeachment of his former deputy, Rigathi Gachagua – has become the defining crisis of his presidency (AC Vol 65 No 20, The deputy takes the fall, Vol 65 No 21, Mountain doesn’t go to Gachagua & Vol 65 No 22, Ruto’s impeachment of his Deputy starts to backfire). With two years until the August 2027 elections, his legitimacy rests on a fragile alliance with his Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) rival, Raila Odinga. Ruto now appears intent on turning the Mount Kenya fallout into a wedge issue and central plank of his re-election campaign. Many fear that, 20 years after the calamitous 2007 polls, 2027 could mark another Kenyan annus horribilis.
The first sign of the government’s crackdown came with the invocation of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) against 71 protestors following the 25 June protests against police killings and the 7 July Saba Saba (‘Seven Seven’) demonstrations (AC Vol 66 No 13, As protests mount, state repression goes regional & Vol 66 No 14, Death toll mounts after protests). Charges stemmed from arson attacks on two police stations, a courthouse and other government buildings in Matuu (Machakos County) and Kikuyu (Kiambu County) – both bordering Nairobi and sites of intensified protest after the CBD was sealed off by police. In Homa Bay County, Western Kenya on 3 July, protestors torched the Mawego Police Station, where Albert Ojwang – the blogger and teacher murdered in a Nairobi police cell in June – had been held (Dispatches 16/6/25, As protests grow, President Ruto admits police killed dissident blogger). Eight were arrested, transferred to Nairobi and charged with terrorism.
The POTA, passed in 2014 after the Westgate terror attack, was designed to counter Al Shabaab insurgents (AC Vol 54 No 20, Shockwaves after the shoot-out & Vol 55 No 19, Security changes mark a sombre anniversary). Rights groups warned its sweeping powers could be used to silence critics – a concern now realised. Among those charged is activist Boniface Mwangi, accused of illegal arms possession though the Directorate of Criminal Investigations has dropped terrorism charges against him (AC Vol 65 No 14, Youth revolt wins after Ruto scraps finance bill and pledges talks). In December 2014, he protested POTA’s passage outside parliament. A decade later, the law has come full circle.
Complicit
Civil society groups have condemned what they see as a coordinated effort to suppress dissent. After Mwangi was released on an unusually high bail, Law Society of Kenya President Faith Odhiambo criticised both the Director of Public Prosecutions, Renson Ingonga, and Chief Justice Martha Koome for perceived judicial complicity. Koome had labelled the Kikuyu courthouse arson an act of terrorism. Ingonga has faced backlash for issuing terrorism charges where lesser offences might have sufficed.
The government’s terrorism narrative has been carefully constructed. Following the arsons, Security Minister Kipchumba Murkomen authorised police to shoot to kill if protestors attacked installations or officers. Ruto later softened the directive – instructing police to ‘shoot them in the leg’ – before blaming Gen Z parents for raising their offspring badly, and warning them that their children would now be ‘taught by the world’.
The police station attacks were used to reframe the 25 June and 7 July protests as coup attempts. Opposition leaders counter that government-backed thugs were behind the vandalism – a claim supported by citizen journalists and mainstream media, who have documented the hiring of boda boda (motorcycle taxi) gangs to infiltrate and disrupt Gen Z protests.
Security officials believe Gachagua sponsored elements of the Gen Z movement, including the attempted to torching of Parliament, the Supreme Court and Nairobi County offices. Other Mount Kenya elites are suspected of funding online anti-government campaigns. In this view, any coup attempt is being orchestrated by Kikuyu leaders using the protests as cover.
Isolating and targeting the Kikuyu risks reigniting the ethnic tensions of 2007-2008. It also underscores the collapse of Ruto’s relationship with the constituency that delivered 63% of his 2022 vote – 4.5 million of his 7.1m total. His legitimacy now hinges on a tenuous pact with Odinga and a patchwork of ethnic alliances.
Regime insiders resist acknowledging that State House’s tone-deaf rollout of a harsh International Monetary Fund austerity programme triggered the sharp decline in Ruto’s and Kenya Kwanza’s popularity. Instead, the more palatable narrative of ‘Kikuyu buyer’s remorse’ has dominated since the early days of his presidency. Fuelled by the purge of Uhuru Kenyatta-era appointees from the civil service, parastatals and security sector, the mass dismissals stirred ethnic grievance – particularly among Gachagua’s allies. Yet the resentment is misplaced: over a third of Ruto’s cabinet and a sizeable share of principal secretaries hail from the 13 Mount Kenya-affiliated counties.
Old formula
In 2022, Ruto’s ‘Hustlers vs Dynasties’ narrative introduced a class dimension into Kenya’s traditionally ethnicised politics. He has since reverted to a formulaic ethnic calculus, now relying on regional powerbrokers to deliver votes: Prime Cabinet Secretary Musalia Mudavadi and National Assembly Speaker Moses Wetang’ula to mobilise the Western Kenya vote; Senate Speaker Amason Jeffa Kingi and Youth Affairs Cabinet Secretary Salim Mvurya – formerly Kwale governor – for the Coast; and Health Cabinet Secretary Aden Duale for the northern vote.
Odinga’s co-option followed the 25 June crisis, but his support in 2027 is far from assured. ODM Secretary-General and Nairobi Senator Edwin Sifuna leads a populist faction urging Odinga to sever ties with Ruto over police killings and abductions. An ethnic Luhya, his stance resonates with Western youth – particularly those backing Trans-Nzoia Governor George Natembeya’s Tawe movement. In Nairobi – with its significant Luhya population – Sifuna poses a growing challenge to ODM conservatives.
More troubling is Ruto’s policy of granting Somali immigrants carte blanche. Natembeya and others warn of serious security risks. But it was Wajir County Women’s Representative Fatuma Abdi’s remark – that Somali voters would rig the 2027 election for Ruto – that raised alarm. Her comment followed Nandi Senator Samson Cherargei’s push to extend elected terms from five to seven years, and statements by Ruto allies Kapseret MP Oscar Sudi and aide Farouk Kibet that they would ‘do whatever it takes’ – widely interpreted as a nod to vote-rigging. Abdi’s remarks deepened concerns of a replay of 2007, when President Mwai Kibaki’s insiders rigged the election and pushed the country to the precipice.
Unlike in 2007, when African Union and western diplomats helped avert disaster, today’s weakened multilateral system offers fewer safeguards. With the Gen Z movement now branded an enemy of the state, the space for dialogue – including Odinga’s proposed ‘national conclave’ – is shrinking. And this time, Kenya’s neighbours and traditional western patrons are distracted.
Copyright © Africa Confidential 2025
https://www.africa-confidential.com
Prepared for Free Article on 27/07/2025 at 09:42. Authorized users may download, save, and print articles for their own use, but may not further disseminate these articles in their electronic form without express written permission from Africa Confidential / Asempa Limited. Contact subscriptions@africa-confidential.com.