PREVIEW
Shifting affiliations and military manoeuvres across the Horn and the Gulf are fuelling tensions
Regional players are adjusting their strategies as conflicts in the Horn of Africa intensify. United States President Donald Trump’s three-country trip to the Gulf from 16 to 19 May did not clarify US policy towards the region’s crises or its attitude towards possible mediation. In response to Trump’s speech, Saudi Prime Minister and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman mentioned the Sudan civil war and stated his intention to restart the Jeddah process. He did not elaborate on whether the framework would be the same as before.
The US president stayed silent and proceeded to Abu Dhabi and Doha in search of new investment. No mention was made of Somalia or Ethiopia, though the US may soon significantly reduce its military presence in Somalia. Serious differences are emerging over the excessive military expansion along the Horn’s shores, the United Arab Emirates-Turkey rivalry in Somalia and Sudan, and Riyadh’s shifting stance, now leaning towards Cairo and Doha against Abu Dhabi (AC Vol 65 No 8, Facing neither west nor east – but forwards).
Growing military activity in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden worries many of the regional powers. In January 2020, Riyadh and seven other Red Sea states formed the Council of Arab and African Coastal States of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden to foster cooperation and combat piracy, smuggling and other threats.
But Saudi Arabia failed to energise the group or take decisive action. Ethiopia was denied membership despite being the Horn’s economic powerhouse. It has a large stake in the region due to its search for access to the sea (AC Vol 62 No 12, Muddled meddling by the UAE).
Tensions are rising as both longstanding and emerging foreign powers are trying to expand their military presence. But the Gulf Cooperation Council appears divided and powerless. Djibouti has been a key hub for foreign militaries for decades. France renewed its defence agreement with Djibouti in July 2024, while the US’s Camp Lemonnier, established in 2001, focuses on counterterrorism and Iranian activities in the Gulf of Aden (Dispatches 21/5/24, US military influence faces growing pressure). Today, Da’esh and Al Shabaab in Somalia, alongside the Houthis in Yemen, remain its primary intelligence targets.
China secured a military base there in 2017, frustrating western nations. Japan and Germany also maintain facilities in Djibouti. It has a strategic location but Djibouti wields limited regional influence. Its former Foreign Minister, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, now Chair of the African Union Commission, struggles to push the AU into action on regional crises. The AU Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia has been weakened by funding shortages.
Russia has been pursuing a military base near Port Sudan since 2017. In February, Khartoum’s former Foreign Minister Ali Yousif visited Moscow seeking military support but later denied making such a request. He has now been replaced by Omar Siddiq, a veteran diplomat whose last post was ambassador to Beijing.
Moscow knows the Sudan Armed Forces-led government is oscillating between it and western powers and Gulf States. The SAF and its allied militias need new military hardware, including ammunition and jet spare parts. In exchange, the SAF has permitted up to four Russian warships to dock in Port Sudan harbour.
Conservative Arab states oppose Moscow’s military presence in the Red Sea region. Saudi Arabia refuses to accept a Russian base within 300km of Jeddah, while Jordan and Egypt fear global tensions could threaten the region’s security. That forces SAF leader General Abdel Fattah al Burhan to tread carefully, avoiding conflict with Riyadh, which has promised to fund Khartoum’s reconstruction.
In January 2018, Turkey struck a deal with then President Omer el Beshir to develop Suakin Island, but no work has started. Regional Arab states opposed the decision, citing hostility to Islamists and the Muslim Brotherhood as a key concern. The presence of Sudanese Islamist figures in Turkey reinforced concerns that Ankara is becoming more important in the SAF’s efforts to regain control of western Sudan.
The acquisition of six Bayraktar TB2 drones was crucial to the September 2024 offensive, reclaiming RSF-held territory east of the Nile, including Khartoum. These drones also carried out devastating strikes on Nyala Airport, a key Rapid Support Forces (RSF) asset.
In February 2024, Turkey signed a defence agreement with Somalia’s Federal Government (Dispatches 28/2/24, Hassan Sheikh ups the ante in Ethiopia port dispute). By April, it had deployed 300 special forces and 200 technicians to manage Bayraktar Akinci and Bayraktar TB2 drones in Mogadishu. A further 2,000 troops are expected soon, bolstering the fight against Al Shabaab ahead of the 2026 elections. This costly military cooperation is complemented by a profitable oil and gas exploration deal, the terms of which remain opaque.
Turkey’s regional policies remain closely tied to Qatari interests. During a July 2024 visit to Doha, Somali Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre expressed frustration with Qatar’s limited financial support. Qatari Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mohammed bin Abdulrahman bin Jassim Al Thani, responded that Doha was funding much of Turkey’s military presence in Somalia, including the TB2 and Akinci drones deployed against Al Shabaab.
Turkey faces domestic economic challenges, and Doha’s financial support is crucial to maintaining its activist policy in the Horn of Africa. Qatar keeps a low profile, avoiding confrontation with Gulf neighbours since the Al-Ula Declaration in January 2021. However, its distrust of the UAE remains strong, with old Islamist alliances still influential.
Iran’s Red Sea presence is shaped by sanctions-driven opportunities. In 1991, it established ties with Sudan, assisting in the civil war, training its security forces and supporting Hamas. Diplomatic relations were severed in 2016 after the attack on the Saudi embassy in Tehran.
Diplomatic relations were restored last July, when the SAF sought military aid, acquiring Mohajer-2, Mohajer-4, and Mohajer-6 drones. Dozens of Iranian military experts are now stationed in camps near Port Sudan, managing drone operations and training Islamist militias, including Al Bara bin Malik. Iran is also helping restore military factories it built in the 1990s, which were looted and partially destroyed after the civil war began.
Saudi Arabia remains concerned by Iran’s presence in the Red Sea, especially in Sudan. Riyadh’s relations with Burhan improved last year, reflecting its unease over the UAE’s assertiveness in Sudan’s civil war.
The Saudi-UAE rivalry is evident in several areas. Yet both leaders maintained a friendly facade when President Trump visited. Both monarchs are hostile to Islamists and wary of Turkey’s growing influence in the Horn and Syria, their differences are widening.
The Jeddah process, launched in May 2023, failed due to UAE support for the RSF and the SAF’s unwillingness to compromise. Now Riyadh wants to consolidate Sudan’s military against hard-line Islamists, while also undermining its Gulf rival. The UAE’s aggressive Somalia policy is viewed negatively, as it indirectly benefits Al Shabaab and allows Turkey to expand its foothold in the region.
Riyadh remains bitter over the UAE’s disengagement from Yemen and its support for factions in Southern Yemen, which undermined Saudi-backed policies. Saudi statements suggest frustration at the UAE’s military ambitions, arguing that Abu Dhabi, as a non-riverine state, should abandon plans for a permanent military presence in Bossaso or Berbera.
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