PREVIEW
A White House-brokered agreement promises regional calm and economic integration, but success depends on dislodging rebels and securing mining rights
Speaking at the White House on 27 June, during the signing of a new peace agreement by the Rwandan and Congolese foreign ministers, President Donald Trump declared that no previous United States president had attempted to broker peace between Rwanda and Congo-Kinshasa – and that none could have succeeded as he had. Vice-President JD Vance, Secretary of State Marco Rubio and US Africa Envoy Massad Boulos all echoed the sentiment (Dispatches 6/5/25, Ceasefire, minerals deal and troops out as peace deal takes shape).
Congolese Foreign Minister Thérèse Kayikwamba Wagner and her Rwandan counterpart Olivier Nduhungirehe praised Trump’s ‘X factor’, distinguishing this deal from the many failed ones before it. Boulos, Kayikwamba and Nduhungirehe all highlighted the agreement’s economic dimension – which Boulos later, incorrectly, described as unique. He also told France 24 that the joint security mechanism and oversight committee were unprecedented, though both have featured in previous peace deals between the two countries.
Washington insiders say speed was the priority. The agreement draws on elements from earlier State Department efforts. The Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) and Forces armées de la république démocratique du Congo high commands are expected to establish a joint security mechanism, as required by the deal – though neither is likely to share sensitive intelligence with the other.
The Joint Oversight Committee will include Rwanda, Congo-K, the US, Qatar, an African Union representative and others. Its effectiveness will be critical. If it can run a functioning secretariat, attract heavyweight leadership and secure strong US backing, it may compel the signatories to honour their commitments.
The agreement’s economic integration element is split between infrastructure and mining. Boulos says deals in both sectors will be signed at the White House in July, when Presidents Félix Tshisekedi and Paul Kagame are expected to attend a grand ceremony.
A bilateral US-Congo-K minerals deal is also under discussion. The riches it promises are intended to anchor the Trump administration’s commitment to the peace agreement.
Power sharing
The centrepiece is a US$760 million hydropower plant on the Ruzizi River between Rwanda and Congo-K (AC Vol 66 No 14, Trump family allies broker security and mining deals in Central Africa). Known as Ruzizi III, the 206 MW project has been 12 years in negotiation. It is led by Industrial Promotion Services, the Aga Khan Fund’s investment arm and was finalised in June when US-owned, Kenya-based Anzana Electric Group joined IPS, the World Bank, British International Investment and the European Investment Bank. Power will be shared between Rwanda, Congo-K and Burundi.
It remains unclear how the infrastructure deal will address Uganda’s push to build roads in eastern Congo-K, which would reorient trade towards Kampala and cut Rwanda’s market share. Rwanda and Uganda are competing to shape regional integration with Congo-K – a rivalry that fuels local conflicts. Despite Uganda’s military presence and trading interests, Washington has largely ignored it.
The mining agreement will be harder to implement. It stipulates that Congolese minerals should be processed in Rwanda in ‘transparent, formalised’ ways. That makes economic sense: electricity is cheaper and more reliable in Rwanda, making it better suited to refining Congolese tin and coltan. But the politics are fraught. Many in Congo-K resent the idea of their mineral wealth being processed in a rival state. Tax differentials also distort trade. Rwanda’s lower levies incentivise smuggling, which has persisted for years (AC Vol 65 No 15, Kinshasa urges sanctions on Kigali citing damning UN report).
The 2010 US Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act aimed at curbing the trade in conflict minerals from Congo-K by requiring supply chain due diligence – but it failed to end smuggling or the flow of such minerals into western supply chains (AC Vol 53 No 23, Dodging Dodd-Frank).
Then there is the Mouvement du 23 mars (M23). Qatari officials have been mediating largely inconclusive talks between the militia and Kinshasa in Doha. A new round is due to begin in mid-July.
Corneille Nangaa, head of the Alliance Fleuve Congo and M23’s political wing, had ambitions to march on Kinshasa and depose Tshisekedi – ambitions reportedly reined in by Kagame, according to the United Nations Group of Experts’ (GoE) report.
Still, M23 is consolidating its hold on captured territory. The UN GoE says it has expelled traditional leaders and civil servants across North Kivu and South Kivu, destroyed land records and forcibly recruited young men. It has also benefited from Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda fighters repatriated to Rwanda and then sent back into Congo-K by the RDF to fight for the militia.
In late June, Chinese-owned Twangiza Mining accused M23 of forcing its workers to labour without pay after seizing its South Kivu gold mine in May. The militia claimed the company had failed to pay taxes to its new administration.
Rubaya deal
M23’s biggest revenue source is the Bibatama coltan mine near Rubaya, which generates hundreds of thousands of dollars a month. Working conditions have deteriorated. There is no technical oversight of the hundreds of small mining shafts dug into Rubaya’s steep hills. A massive mudslide in mid-June buried scores of miners. At least 17 bodies were recovered, many more remain buried in the mud.
On 27 June, Africa Confidential reported that Gentry Beach – hedge fund executive, chair of America First Global and the finance co-chair of Trump’s 2016 election campaign – was negotiating with the Tshisekedi government to acquire the Rubaya permit.
America First Global would partner with Société Aurifère du Kivu et du Maniema (SAKIMA), a state-owned firm that took over the permit after it was confiscated from Senator Édouard Mwangachuchu’s Société Minière de Bisunzu. Mwangachuchu, a Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple founder, was sentenced to death by a military court in 2023 and remains in detention.
Complicating matters, the current legal owner of Rubaya, according to the mining cadastre in Kinshasa, is Serge Mulumba and his company Congo Fair Mining. Mulumba told Africa Confidential he knew nothing about the US investment plans. ‘We need markets and off-takers, not investors as the revenues can provide the means to develop the mine,’ he said.
If the Rubaya deal materialises, it would be the boldest element of the proposed US minerals accord with Kinshasa. But for it to happen, Kagame needs to eject the M23 from Rubaya and allow the Americans to take over – in partnership with a notoriously corrupt Congolese parastatal.
For the M23 to withdraw would mean surrendering the fiscal base of its proto-state. The GoE report argues – and many agree – that M23 is acting at Rwanda’s behest, as Kagame seeks to establish a loyal client entity next door.
If Trump succeeds in clearing the way for his allies to invest in one of Congo-K’s largest mines – while forcing the M23 and Kagame to abandon their political ambitions – it would be a remarkable achievement.
In early June, US-based Denham Capital sold its majority stake in the Alphamin tin mine in Bisie, North Kivu, to the United Arab Emirates’s International Resource Holding. Though Alphamin was spared M23 occupation – reportedly after Boulos requested Kagame intervene – Denham sold at a discount. IRH’s CEO is Ali Alrashdi (AC Vol 66 No 8, Washington tries a new push in Kinshasa).
Another potential US target is the Manono lithium deposit. KoBold Metals, backed by Bill Gates and Jeff Bezos, wants to acquire the permit held by Australia’s AVZ Minerals. But in 2023, Kinshasa cancelled AVZ’s rights and split the permit, awarding half to China’s Zijin. AVZ took the matter to international arbitration, suspended proceedings at Washington’s request, but resumed them on 23 June, citing Kinshasa’s failure to engage.
KoBold hopes Zijin will retain the northern half while it develops the southern portion. It wants the Congolese government – not AVZ’s partner Cominière – as its joint venture partner. Like SAKIMA, Cominière is bankrupt and notorious for rent-seeking.
Beyond Rubaya and Manono, it is unclear what other Congolese mining assets US companies might acquire. Investors who recently assessed ERG’s copper and cobalt assets in Haut-Katanga and Lualaba walked away, deterred by the operational risks. Glencore’s assets are not for sale, nor are those of the major Chinese firms.
Congo-K’s mineral wealth is vast but converting it into American ownership will not be easy. And if the returns disappoint, Tshisekedi may need to find new ways to keep Trump interested.
| |
|
|
|
Peace on paper – war on the ground
A United Nations Group of Experts (GoE) report identifies four key dynamics that threaten the viability of the United States-brokered peace deal between Congo-Kinshasa and Rwanda:
- The Mouvement du 23 mars (M23) militia and its political wing, the Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC) are consolidating control over governance, land rights and natural resources in Kivu Nord and Kivu Sud
- The Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF) is expanding operations in eastern Congo-K and backing its own M23-aligned faction
The report, covering developments up to late April, was submitted to the UN Security Council in May. It challenges the Security Council to act, arguing that Rwanda’s support for the occupation of eastern Congo-K is sanctionable.
The viability of the peace agreement signed in Washington DC on 27 June hinges on the M23, which was not party to the deal but is strongly backed by Rwanda. The UN report notes growing tensions within the M23 and worsening divisions between Rwandan- and Ugandan-aligned factions.
The GoE says the M23 is entrenching itself in eastern Congo-K, forcibly recruiting and training thousands of combatants – including former Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR) fighters who had returned to Rwanda but were forcibly ‘recycled’ by the RDF into M23 ranks. The report says the AFC–M23 alliance led by Corneille Nangaa is dismantling state authority and replacing it with parallel governance, erasing land records and imposing its own tax regime.
The GoE documents instances of direct RDF military support for M23, stating that RDF officers were ‘critical’ to the militia’s territorial gains. The RDF’s Major-General Ruki Karusisi, Major-General Eugène Nkubito and Lieutenant-General Mubarakh Mugunga are named as key planners and commanders. The report rejects Kigali’s claim that its deployment is aimed at neutralising the FDLR, asserting instead that the RDF’s objective is to conquer territory and enable AFC–M23 consolidation. It concludes that Rwanda’s conduct is sanctionable and urges the Security Council to respond.
Uganda’s role is also scrutinised. The UPDF has expanded its operations in eastern Congo-K and now polices the de facto border at Lubero in North Kivu. Although officially operating alongside the Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo (FARDC), Uganda’s General Muhoozi Kainerugaba – son of President Yoweri Museveni – travelled to Kinshasa in June, where he met President Félix Tshisekedi to extend bilateral military cooperation.
The FARDC, under international pressure, launched a brief and unsuccessful offensive against the FDLR in early 2025, but soon resumed collaboration with FDLR units and with the Congolese Wazalendo militia.
The GoE confirms that M23 controls the Rubaya mine and is smuggling coltan to Rwanda. It names Boss Mining Solution – run by Rwandan businessman Eddy Habimana and linked to the International Tin Supply Chain Initiative traceability scheme – as a key buyer. The Rwanda Development Board is accused of inflating domestic production figures to mask illicit Congolese imports, contradicting data from Rwanda’s National Institute of Statistics, independent geological studies and ITSCI records.
The report also details the conflict in Ituri province between the predominantly Lendu Coopérative pour le développement du Congo and the Hema Zaïre militias. On June 28, a peace agreement was signed in Aru between CODECO, Zaïre and other Ituri-based groups.
Rwanda has dismissed the report, claiming the experts misunderstood the RDF’s ‘defensive posture’ in eastern Congo-K. Kigali’s denial of well-documented allegations foreshadows likely disputes over the implementation of the Washington agreement – especially as Kinshasa is expected to accuse Rwanda of continued M23 support. It will fall to the Joint Oversight Committee to hold the ring.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Copyright © Africa Confidential 2025
https://www.africa-confidential.com
Prepared for Free Article on 11/07/2025 at 17:48. Authorized users may download, save, and print articles for their own use, but may not further disseminate these articles in their electronic form without express written permission from Africa Confidential / Asempa Limited. Contact subscriptions@africa-confidential.com.